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Network Externalities and Shared Electronic Banking Network Adoption 
Abstract 
A unique data set is used to examine the determinants of membership in the 
Yankee 24 shared Automated Teller Machine (ATM) network. Recent work suggests 
that the presence of demand side network externalities influences the decision 
to join a network. A model is constructed in which characteristics of the bank 
and the market affect the value of the network externality. A hazard function 
is estimated to gauge the strength of these various influences in determining 
network membership. The results accord with the theoretical model and show that 
the size of the existing network and the number of expected locations in the 
network, proxied by the number of branches in a bank's market, are both strong 
influences on network adoption that are external to the individual bank. 
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Netvork Externalities and Shared Electronic Banking Netvork Adoption 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade information and physical networks in banking and other 
services have consolidated greatly. In particular, Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM) networks have managed to increase the number of their cardholders and 
transactions overall, while ATM activity has become concentrated in fewer and 
larger networks.' The presence of network economies onboth the demand and cost 
side, which may be external to an individual network member, can contribute to 
the growth and consolidation of the indu~try.~ With positive network 
externalities, the value of network participation to a potential member grows as 
the network grows. The incentive to take advantage of substantial network 
externalities can result in rapid growth of a network under the expectation that 
others will participate in the network. In this paper we will test the 
hypotheses that the size of the network influences the adoption decision and that 
rapid growth of an individual ATM network will occur in markets that are expected 
to generate large network externalities. 
Related work on adoption of ATMs is found in Hannan and McDowell (1984, 
1987), who use a hazard function to estimate the factors that influenced banks 
to adopt ATMs in the 1970s, before the advent of shared ATM networks. Saloner 
and Shepard (1992) use a hazard function approach to test for the presence of an 
internal "network effect" in the ATM adoption decision for banks in the 1970s 
using the size of the individual bank's branch network as a proxy for the 
expected size of the bank's proprietary ATM network. 
This paper faces a different task because in a shared ATM network the 
I~c~ndrews (1991) documents the extent of the consolidation in shared ATM 
networks. 
2 ~ e e  Heal (1990), for example. 
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network effects are external to the firm. The number and location of other 
participants who install ATMs in the network affect the convenience that a bank's 
own customers can enjoy when that bank is a member of the network. As a result . 
of this feature of shared networks, multiple equilibria may exist in the adoption 
process. A small or large network may be the outcome of the adoption decisions 
of the potential members depending on whether the potential adopters expect that 
few or many others will adopt network membership. 
To test whether network externalities influence network participation, we 
use the size of the existing network and characteristics of the markets in which 
the banks participate as explanatory variables. If a market is one in which 
there is expected to be many locations from which a bank customer can access her 
account through the ATM network (for any given expectations on adoption 
decisions), then the external benefits of network participation are greater than 
they would be in a market in which few network locations are expected. This, in 
turn, will make more probable ahigh-participation equilibrium in the market with 
many expected locations. 
Yankee 24 offers a good case to characterize the adoption process. Yankee 
24 (often abbreviated to "Yankee" in what follows) started in 1983 and restricted 
membership to Connecticut banks until 1987.~ During that time it grew to become 
the largest network in New England in number of affiliated ATXs. In 1987 
membership was offered to all the depository institutions in the other five New 
England states. Yankee 24 was the most prominent network offering its services 
to the upper New England depositories. Competitive pressure, although increasing 
during the sample period, was relatively light. 
3 ~ h i s  restriction was not as a result of regulation, but rather a management 
decision. 
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Our sample includes the five upper New England states over the period 1987 
through 1991. We group our sample into 96 local banking markets: 31 MSAs and 65 
counties. We eliminate Connecticut from consideration to avoid the issue of 
start-up of the network, and the fact that the Connecticut banks had a longer 
period over which to adopt Yankee membership. We limit our study to commercial 
and savings banks because these institutions are the largest and most important 
members of Yankee in terms of cardholders and ATM deployers, and because we can 
obtain consistent data on their characteristics over the sample period. Figure 
1 shows the adoption pattern in our sample of banks. Over the course of the 
sample, approximately 47 percent of the banks in the sample adopted Yankee 
membership. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I1 a model 
of network adoption is developed. In Section I11 the history of Yankee 24 and 
other features of the markets are reviewed. Section IV presents the estimation 
method and explains the data. The results of the empirical estimation are 
presented in Section V, and Section VI concludes. 
2. Model 
There are many useful models of network adoption; Katz and Shapiro (1986) 
and Farrell and Saloner (1986) both examine the issue. To test for the presence 
of network externalities on the adoption process, we will adopt the model of 
Cabral (1990), that allows for heterogeneity in the benefits available from 
network membership, and is explicitly dynamic. The benefits flowing from 
membership upon adoption are B(h,N, t), where N is the measure of adopters at time 
t, h is a parameter that characterizes an individual bank (the higher the h for 
a bank, the higher is the benefit from adopting Yankee membership, all other 
things remaining equal), and t is time. We assume that B is smooth, that the 
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first ~artial derivatives exist, and that h has a smooth c.d.f., F(h). 
The assumption that there are externalities in network participation is 
captured by BN > 0. We further have that B,, > 0, and B, > 0. The latter 
assumption reflects the exogenous trend to increased benefits from adoption of 
the shared network technology, reflecting improvements in the technology itself 
We assume that banks have alternatives to network membership that yield the 
flow of benefits per unit of time  hat we set equal to zero. This is a 
convenient normalization, and without loss of generality so long as all potential 
adopters face similar opportunity costs of adoption. 
In equilibrium, all types h for which B(h,N,t) 2 0 will adopt membership. 
The set of static equilibrium adopters is then described as follows. Let the 
level of h of the potential adopter who is indifferent to adopting given N and 
t be denoted by i(N,t); that is B(i(N,t),N,t) - 0. Define H(N,t) - 1 - 
F(i(N,t)). H(N,t) is the set of potential adopters who have levels of h high 
enough to make it worthwhile for them to adopt in period t, when N total banks 
adopt. A static equilibrium for time t is a measure of adopters, N, such that 
N - H(N, t). We define s(t) as the set of static equilibrium measures of adoption 
for each time t. 
It is well known that s(t) is not single valued, that is, there are 
typically multiple static equilibria. Broadly speaking, the equilibria can vary 
from one in which there is wide participation, encouraging even low-benefit (low 
h) types to adopt early, to low participation, in which only the high-benefit 
types adopt. Furthermore, there are multiple equilibrium adoption paths. An 
equilibrium adoption path is a function ~'(t) such that ~'(t) e s(t) for all t. 
The equilibrium paths vary from one with a strong bandwagon effect in which many 
quickly join, encouraging even low-benefit types to join, to slow inertial paths, 
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in which only high-benefit types join early, discouraging low-benefit types from 
joining until the network has grown larger. Cabral shows that if there is a 
slight delay in observing the adoption decision of others, then there is a unique 
adoption path, the-lower envelope of the set s(t) for all t. 
Our empirical results center on three features of Cabral's model of 
adoption. First, one's adoption decision is influenced by the number of other 
adopters. Second, in any static equilibrium, directly as a result of the 
definition of equilibrium, the adopters have higher levels of h than the 
nonadopters. Third, in any equilibrium adoption path, the sets of adopters (if 
we are observing an equilibrium with adoption) at times t2 > tl are such that 
~"(t,) 5: ~'(t,), that is, the set of adopters is cumulative. Because we assume 
that B, > 0 ,  along any equilibrium adoption path there will be no reversals of 
adoption. Because of this feature, and because BN > 0 ,  it is also true that 
those who adopt earlier have a higher level of h than those who adopt later. 
These three features of the model of adoption yield the hypotheses for our 
empirical investigation of the adoption of Yankee 24 membership. First, we 
expect that a measure of the size of the network will be a significant influence 
in the adoption decision. Second,, those banks that adopt Yankee 24  membership 
will be those who will derive greater benefits from the network, independently 
of the number of other adopters, than those who do not join during our sample 
period. Third, high-benefit banks will adopt earlier than other banks. 
What bank types will enjoy high benefits from network participation? In 
other words, what is the form of the function B(h,N, t)? ATMs are used to provide 
services to bank customers; shared ATM networks allow one bank's customer to 
access his or her account at machines owned by other network-members at ATM 
locations that might be convenient for the customer at a given time. Network 
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benefits to a bank's customer per period have been modeled by Saloner and Shepard 
(1992) as being equal to [a(X) + b(m)], where a(X) is the "stand-alone" benefit 
from the network, X is a vector of characteristics of a bank and its market, and 
b(m) is the benefit the customer gets as a result'of being able to access her 
account at the m network-affiliated machine locations. The function b(m) is 
increasing in m. Machine deployment requires expenditure of a fixed cost, so 
that it requires a minimum expected number of customers to deploy a machine. 
Hence the number of machines and machine locations, both for an individual bank 
and for the network, depends positively on the number of banks that have joined 
the network; that is, m is an increasing function of N. Finally, a bank, through 
fees charged to its own customers, can capture some portion, A ,  of these benefits 
that flow to its n customers. Following Saloner and Shepard, we expect these 
benefits to grow over time at the rate gt, where g is the rate of technical 
progress. 
Banks may also experience indirect benefits from adoption by substituting 
the Yankee provision of services for costly labor or branches that it would 
otherwise have to use to provide services. These savings can be thought of as 
being equal to C(w,r,Q) - Cy(w,r,Q), where C(w,r,Q) is the cost function for a 
bank that does not adopt Yankee membership, evaluated at wage rate w and capital 
rental rate r, and at output level Q, and Cy is the cost function of a Yankee 
member bank. 
The costs of adoption of Yankee 24 are twofold. There is an adoption fee, 
fees for bringing ATMs on-line, and regular assessments for network services. 
Adoption fees for Yankee were equal to $5000 for the first six months of the 
sample period, $0 for the next three months, $5000 for the next nine months, and 
$50 thereafter. We will denote the adoption fee by P(t). There were no direct 
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dividends paid to owner-members during the sample period. Fees for bringing ATMs 
on line will be related to the number of ATMs a bank has before joining Yankee, 
which we will proxy by the size of a bank's branch network. We assume that 
transaction fees are paid by the bank customers. Second, there may be 
opportunity costs if a bank, before adoption of membership, already has a 
proprietary ATM network from which it enjoys internally generated network 
benefits, or if there is a strong rival network in the bank's market. These 
costs we will denote C,(B,R, t), where B is a bank's own branches, and R is a 
measure of the presence of rival networks. Because banks place ATMs in their 
branches (see Saloner and Shepard(l992)), it is more likely that banks with large 
branch networks had active proprietary networks in 1987, hence their opportunity 
costs of Yankee network membership would be higher. If a large rival network is 
present in a bank's market, then Yankee faces more effective competition and the 
opportunity costs of Yankee membership in that market are higher than in a market 
without such strong competition (the level of competition may change through time 
so C, is time-varying) .4 
In sum, banks are likely to enjoy net discounted benefits from Yankee 
adoption in time period T according to a function 
. 
where the sum is taken over the period from 0 to infinity, and where A t  is the 
discount factor. We can express this simply as 1~ - B(h,N,T); where h - 
h(X,n,w,r,Q,F,B,R). The benefit function is increasing in the number of 
4~nother possible benefit from network adoption is that individual members 
may expect to earn "interchange" revenue from other member banks by deploying 
ATMs that other member-banks' customers use. In our view, this transfer among 
members is a more significant issue for ATM deployment than for adoption of 
membership itself. 
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locations at which a bank's depositors can conveniently access their accounts, 
a factor related to the number of other adopters of network membership. It is 
also increasing in the current wage rate paid by the bank, in the cost of and 
need for new branches, and in the number of one's own customers, and decreasing 
in the number of one's own branches. This last effect suggests that 
geographically small banks, that is, those with a small branch network, are 
likely to benefit most from network membership. Net benefits to Yankee adoption 
are reduced by the presence of rival networks, and are influenced by bank size 
and other features of the banking market, such as concentration, denoted by X ,  
3. Yankee 24 
New England Network Inc. is the Connecticut-based owner of the Yankee 24 
shared electronic fund transfer network. The network was officially organized 
in August 1983 by the nine largest banks in Connecticut. Together they accounted 
for more than 50 percent of the state's banking assets and had more than 400 
ATMs. The network organization was then called Connecticut Switch Inc., and was 
established as a nonstock, nonprofit membership corporation. The nine founders 
secured permanent control of the governance of the network for themselves. In 
July 1984, Yankee 24 went into operation and began to seek other banking firm 
b 
members. 
In 1985, Yankee 24 became the largest New England shared electronic banking 
network in terms of number of ATMs shared and interbank ATM transactions. 
However, there were some other shared networks in New England.' We will 
5~ignificant shared networks in Massachusetts included MONEC owned by Bank 
of Boston, X-PRESS 24 owned by BayBanks, Inc., and CASHNET owned by Shawmut 
Corp., Boston. INSTACARD, owned by Maine National Bank, operated in Maine, and 
the POCKETBANK shared network in New Hampshire was owned by 7 members. The 
ACCESS shared network owned by The Howard Bank, Burlington, was dominant in 
Vermont. 
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explicitly include the presence of these competitive networks in our estimation 
to observe the effects of the presence of competition on the growth of Yankee. 
By the fourth quarter of 1986, two years after the network went into 
operation, the Yankee 24 shared electronic fund transfer network had 127 members 
and 789 ATMs. In February 1987, banking firms in other New England states were 
allowed to join the shared network organization, when the network's marketing 
staff were actively soliciting new members in those states, based on prior 
approval by the network's board of directors. Throughout the sample period 
Yankee 24 continued to be the dominant shared electronic banking network in New 
England. By April 1991 it included more than 700 network members, in which 500 
were active and on-line, and had more than 4,000 ATMs accessible to all members' 
ATM cardholders. 
Our study will examine the factors that raised the probability of early 
- ***- 
adoption by banking firms in the five upper New England states: Massachusetts, 
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The restriction to these states 
allows us to focus on the growth of Yankee starting in January 1987, when 
membership was offered to depositories in these states, and to focus on the 
growth of a network that was, in effect, the focal network to begin with. 
b 
Yankee's prior success in Connecticut showed depositories in neighboring states 
that the Yankee management was capable and that the Yankee services were in 
demand in markets much like their own. Yankee's installed base of membership in 
1987 was already larger than that of any competing network. Hence, Yankee 
offered a network technology that had many advantages over its rivals. Yankee, 
we believe, was the clear leader among shared network alternatives for those 
institutions considering such a move. We will not assume, however, that 
competitive pressure on Yankee was constant over the sample period. In fact, 
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with  t h e  in t roduct ion of the  MAC and NYCE networks t o  New England i n  t h e  l a t e  
1980s,  competitive pressure was increas ing.  
4 .  Est imation and Data 
Recal l  t h a t  the  net  discounted b e n e f i t s  received by a  bank from adoption 
a t  time T, when N o ther  banks a r e  i n  the network, a r e  
- B ( ~ , N , T ) ;  where h  - h(X,n,w,r,Q,F,B,R) The l a r g e r  the  h ,  t h e  g rea te r  t h e  n e t  
b e n e f i t s  t h a t  w i l l  flow from the  Yankee adoption dec i s ion ,  f o r  any given l e v e l  
of o the r  adopters .  Hence f o r  any given s e t  of expecta t ions  on t h e  adoption l e v e l  
of o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  adopters ,  there  w i l l  be a  threshold  l e v e l  of h so t h a t  a l l  
those  wi th  hi above t h a t  l e v e l  w i l l  adopt i n  t h a t  time per iod ,  while those with 
hi below t h a t  l e v e l  w i l l  wait  t o  adopt. Because we've assumed tha t  g > 0 ,  
'Cu .... 
B(hi,N,T + 1 )  1 B(hi ,N,T) . For a  given bank, i f  B(hi ,N,T) 1 0 ,  then t h a t  bank 
adopts membership. 
There may be id iosyncra t i c  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  value  banks p lace  on network 
membership a f t e r  accounting f o r  a l l  the observable in f luences  mentioned above. 
To take  account of these  id iosyncrac ies ,  l e t  c ,  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  per period 
. 
d e v i a t i o n  of bank i ' s  va lua t ion  of membership from t h e  average of banks wi th  the  
same l e v e l s  of the  o the r  v a r i a b l e s  i n  n ,  where E(ci) - 0 .  Hence, we have t h a t  
, T) + c i  2 0,  o r  when c i  r - B  (h i ,  T) , then the  bank adopts .  We def ine  
t h e  c r i t i c a l  l e v e l  of  ci,  by t h e  equation 
Then c; is the  c i  of the  bank with the  l e v e l  of hi t h a t  is j u s t  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  
j o i n i n g  Yankee when i t  expects  N banks t o  be members of  Yankee a t  che end of the  
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pe r iod .  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a  bank w i l l  adopt  membership i n  p e r i o d  T given t h a t  
i t  expec t s  t h e r e  t o  be N Yankee members a t  t h e  end of t h e  p e r i o d ,  and given t h a t  
i t  has n o t  adopted membership i n  previous p e r i o d s ,  i s  
where G(-) is t h e  cumulative d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  of  e i .  T h i s  express ion  i s  
t h e  "hazard  r a t e . "  
W e  w i l l  e s t i m a t e  equat ion (2)  by means of  t h e  Weibul l  model of  du ra t ion .  
I t  i s  a  s t a n d a r d  technique t o  es t imate  hazard  r a t e s  f o r  d a t a  s e t s  t h a t  have 
been " r i g h t - c e n s o r e d , "  because not  a l l  banks adopted  membership by the  end of 
t h e  sample p e r i o d .  The Weibull d i s t r i b u t i o n  a l lows  f o r  a  monotonic hazard 
r a t e ,  and we w i l l  i nco rpora t e  cova r i a t e s  t o  t e s t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  our  model of  
adopt ion.  
I n  t h e  haza rd  model employed, t he  time t o  a d o p t i o n  i s  grouped i n t o  
q u a r t e r l y  i n t e r v a l s .  We l e t  Xi be the  v e c t o r  o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the bank 
and /I be t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  be es t imated ,  t h e n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  bank i 
adopts  b e f o r e  t ime T i s  given by 
G ( X , ,  P ,  T , U )  = 1 -  exp [-(eXiB) PI .
The parameter  a is a measure of  t he  r a t e  a t  which t h e  h a z a r d  r a t e  changes over  
t ime.6 The haza rd  r a t e  i s  i nc reas ing  a s  a i s  l e s s  t h a n  one ,  and decreas ing  a s  
a i s  g r e a t e r  t han  one .  The hazard r a t e  i s  t h e n  g i v e n  by aexp(Xia)ta .  A s  
Saloner  and Shepard (1992) p o i n t  ou t ,  t h e  Weibul l  o f f e r s  a  u s e f u l  
''The Weibull  d i s t r i b u t i o n  func t ion  is  t y p i c a l l y  w r i t t e n  a s  
F ( t )  - 1 - exp(-Ata) .  
We l e t  X - exp(Xip) t o  i nco rpora t e  the  e f f e c t s  o f  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a k i a b l e s ;  s e e  
Kiefer  (1988).  
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interpretation of the coefficients; the estimated coefficients measure the 
derivative of the log of the hazard rate with resect to X. The likelihood 
function to be estimated will be 
where g(*) is the density function, and G(*) the cumulative distribution 
function for the Weibull distribution. The dummy variable di takes on the 
value 1 when bank i adopts Yankee membership in the sample period, and it 
takes on the value 0 if bank i has not adopted Yankee membership by the end of 
the sample period and is therefore a censored observation.' 
To determine the impact of factors influencing network membership, we 
collected data that includes the identity and timing of adoption of all Yankee 
24 members; population data from the Bureau of Census, information on deposit 
accounts and location of branches from the Federal Reserve's Summary of 
Deposit report; information on expenses and deposits for banking firms 
operating in New England from the Federal Reserve.Systemls Call Reports. Data 
on the presence of rival networks in New England during the sample period was 
obtained from the Bank Network News, a publication of Fzulkner and Gray, 
Publishers. Membership adoption dates and membership fees were provided by 
New England Network Inc. Call report data, including bank characteristics and 
financial performance, were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. 
We obtained a list of 577 Yankee 24 members based on 1991 data. For the 
purpose of this study, the sample was restricted to commercial banks and 
7 ~ n  our formulation, as in Saloner and Shepard (1992), a positive 
coefficienc increases the hazard rate, i.e., leads to quicker adoption, and a 
negative coefficient tends co decrease the hazard rate. 
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savings banks. Thus, 221 credit unions or savings and loans are excluded, 
resulting in 356 member banks. We restricted this list further to include 
only banks whose home office was in the upper New England states excluding 
Connecticut. We merged this data set with the data on all the banks in the 
upper New England states that had continuously reported on both the Call 
Reports and the Summary of Deposits during the sample years of 1987 through 
1990. We eliminated those banks that entered or exited the market during the 
sample period, or those banks that for some other reason, did not have a 
continuous record of data on the Call Report and Summary of Deposit report 
during the sample period, and 246 banks and savings banks remained in the 
sample. Eliminating banks in the upper New England states that were founding 
members of Yankee 24, or were affiliated with founding members through a bank 
holding company, yielded 242 banks in the sample as shown in Table 1. 
The estimation will include various characteristics of the market in 
which a bank participates. The market areas are defined to be the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which a bank branch is located, or if 
it is not in an MSA, then the county (excluding any part of the county that 
may be in an MSA) in which the bank branch is located. 
Our measures of the base of Yankee membership, the adoption price of 
Yankee membership, and the degree of competitive presence are all time 
varying. The other variables are non-time-varying. We now wish to discuss 
the covariates and how they proxy for the features mentioned earlier. 
(1) LAGBASE: the installed base of Yankee members in a market, measured by 
the percentage of a market's deposits that are in banks that have 
adopted Yankee membership by the previous quarter. Depending on the 
nature of the equilibrium path in the adoption game, the sign of the 
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c o e f f i c i e n t  can be negat ive  i n  a  s t r o n g  bandwagon e f f e c t  equi l ibr ium 
p a t h  when many adopt e a r l y ,  o r  p o s i t i v e  i n  an i n e r t i a l  equi l ibr ium 
adop t ion  p a t h ,  i n  which t h e  network e f f e c t s  a r e  n o t  expec ted  t o  acc rue  
u n t i l  l a t e  i n  the  sample pe r iod .  I f  t h e r e  were no network e x t e r n a l i t y  
p r e s e n t ,  adopt ion  would be u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i n s t a l l e d  base  of u s e r s ,  and 
t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  would be zero . '  
( 2 )  OWNBRANCH: t h e  t o t a l  number of branch o f f i c e s  ope ra t ed  by the  
bank. This  is  a  measure of t h e  " i n t e r n a l  network e f f e c t "  t h a t  a  
bank may have been cap tu r ing  p r i o r  t o  j o i n i n g  a  sha red  network. 
Sa loner  and Shepard (1992) found t h i s  v a r i a b l e  t o  be  p o s i t i v e  and 
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  expla in ing  adoption of ATMs by banks i n  t h e  1970s,  
p r i o r  t o  s h a r i n g .  To the  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  does measure t h e  i n t e r n a l  
network e f f e c t ,  and t h e r e f o r e  an  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  o f  j o i n i n g  
Yankee, we would expect t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on t h i s  v a r i a b l e  t o  be 
nega t ive .  
MKTBRANCH: a weighted average of t he  pe r  c a p i t a  number o f  branches 
(o f  a l l  t h e  banks) i n  t h e  markets i n  which a  bank h a s  a  branch.  
Th i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  a  measure of  t h e  number of l o c a t i o n s  a t  which a  
I 
bank ' s  customers can acces s  t h e i r  accounts  once a  bank j o i n s  
Yankee, Why should i t  be  a  proxy f o r  Yankee l o c a t i o n s ?  There a r e  
t h r e e  r e a s o n s ;  f i r s t  banks t y p i c a l l y  p l ace  ATMs i n  t h e i r  branch 
' ~ h i s  v a r i a b l e ,  a s  we l l  a s  t he  MKTBRANCH, MKTPOP, CONCENTRATION, and 
POPCHANGE v a r i a b l e s ,  i s  a  weighted average of t he  v a l u e s  of  t h e  v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  
markets  i n  which t h e  bank has a branch.  The weights  a r e  t h e  s h a r e s  of t h e  bank ' s  
t o t a l  d e p o s i t s  t h a t  t h e  bank has  i n  branches l o c a t e d  i n  each market.  For 
example, i f  a  bank p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  two markets and has  75 p e r c e n t  of i t s  d e p o s i t s  
i n  i t s  branches i n  market A ,  and 25 pe rcen t  of i t s  d e p o s i t s  i n  branches i n  market 
B, t h e n  t h e  market v a r i a b l e  would be a  weighted average o f  t h e  va lues  o f  t h e  
v a r i a b l e s  i n  markets  A and B, w i t h  t h e  weights  be ing  75 p e r c e n t  and 25 p e r c e n t  
f o r  t h a t  bank. 
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offices, and given a constant proportion, regionwide, of Yankee 
adoption, those markets with a large number of branches should 
have more Yankee ATM locations than those with few branches. 
Second, this-variable is meant to capture other features 
(geographic and demographic) of the market that result in more 
branch service delivery. Finally, it is likely that the use of 
network locations will be greatest within market, rather than 
equally distributed across Yankee's service region. In other 
words, we expect that the externalities generated through Yankee 
will be primarily local (i.e., within the local banking market). 
We expect the sign of this variable to be positive. 
(4) MKTPOP: a weighted average of the population in the markets in which a 
bank has a branch in 1980. This variable provides a control for the 
MKTBRANCH variable, since those markets with high population will have a 
large number of branches as well. While it is a measure of the size of 
the market of the bank, it is not clear how this would influence 
adoption. We have taken the log of population, since the variable is 
skewed to the right. 
(5) POPBRANCH: Because there may be nonlinearities in the relationship of 
MKTBRANCH and MKTPOP on adoption, we include the product of MKTBRANCH 
and MKTPOP. Hence, POPBRANCH - MKTBRANCH * MKTPOP. 
(6) LNDEP: log of total demand deposits. This is a measure of the number of 
customers of a bank. The logarithm is used because of the skewed 
distribution of deposits and because of its correlation with branches. 
This measure is used because the Summary of Deposit report did not 
collect data on the number of deposit accounts during the Sample period. 
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We expec t  the  s ign  of t h i s  c o e f f i c i e n t  t o  be p o s i t i v e .  
( 7 )  PRICE: t h e  p r i c e  of jo in ing  the  Yankee network. PRICE equals  $5000 f o r  
t h e  f i r s t  n ine  months of the sample p e r i o d ,  $0 f o r  t h e  next  th ree  
months, $5000 f o r  the next  n ine  months, and $50 t h e r e a f t e r .  We would 
expec t  t h a t  a  high adoption p r i c e  would t end  t o  d iscourage  adoption,  and 
s o  we expect  a  negat ive c o e f f i c i e n t  on PRICE. 
( 8 )  COMPETITION: a  measure of t he  s i z e  and number of r i v a l  shared  ATM 
networks i n  New England. COMPETITION i s  c r e a t e d  by count ing  the t o t a l  
number of ne twork -a f f i l i a t ed  ATMs i n  New England i n  each s t a t e  and i n  
each y e a r  of t h e  sample. ~ f t e r  s u b t r a c t i n g  t h e  number of Yankee- 
a f f i l i a t e d  ATMs, the remainder i s  d i v i d e d  by t h e  number of  r i v a l  shared  
ATM networks opera t ing  i n  t he  p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e .  Hence t h e  l a r g e r  a r e  
t h e  competing networks, the  h ighe r  w i l l  be  COMPETITION. The model 
sugges t s  t h a t  a l a r g e r  network, o t h e r  t h i n g s  e q u a l ,  would be more 
a t t r a c t i v e  t o  a  p o t e n t i a l  member. We expec t  compet i t ion  t o  a t t r a c t  some 
of t he  banks who otherwise would have j o i n e d  Yankee. So we expect  t h e  
c o e f f i c i e n t  a s soc i a t ed  wi th  COMPETITION t o  be  n e g a t i v e .  -- 
(9 )  POPCHANGE: a  weighted average of  p o p u l a t i o n  growth i n  t h e  markets i n  
. 
which a  bank has  a  branch over t he  p e r i o d  1980 t o  1 9 9 0 . ~  This p rox ie s  
f o r  growth i n  demand f o r  banking s e r v i c e s ,  something t h a t  should 
i n c r e a s e  t h e  demand f o r  shared  network s e r v i c e s .  I t  fur thermore 
r e p r e s e n t s  t hose  a reas  i n  which new b ranches  might be  c a l l e d  f o r ;  hence ,  
Yankee membership, t o  t h e  e x t e n t  it can  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  b u i l d i n g  of  
b ranches ,  should  be more d e s i r a b l e  i n  t h e  a r e a s  i n  which popu la t ion  
'This v a r i a b l e  i s  expressed a s  t h e  change i n  p o p u l a t i o n  p e r  square  mi l e  from 
1980 t o  1990. Because the  geographica l  a r e a s  d i d  n o t  change ovef t h i s  p e r i o d ,  
i t  measures only  t h e  change i n  popu la t ion .  
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grew. We expect this coefficient to be positive. 
(10) SAL-EMP: salary per employee, defined as salaries and employee benefits 
over full-time equivalent employees. This variable is a measure of the 
wage rate paid by a bank, and to the extent that Yankee membership can 
substitute for costly bank employees, we would expect it to have a 
positive coefficient. 
(11) OCC-EW: occupancy expenses per branch per asset, which equals 
occupancy expense and furniture and equipment divided by the number of 
bank branches and then by assets (all for 1987). This variable measures 
the "bricks and mortar" expense of a bank per branch per dollar of 
assets, and we would expect a positive coefficient to the extent that 
Yankee membership can substitute for traditional bricks and mortar. 
(12) CONCENTRATION: the four-firm concentration ratio. CONCENTRATION 
'P w.4- 
provides a measure of the degree of competition in each market at the 
start of the sample period. The effect of oligopolistic competition in 
the market on adoption of Yankee membership is uncertain. 
(13) BHCDUMMY: a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the bank is a 
member of a bank holding company. As is the case with OWNBRANCH, this 
variable would be associated with banks that were more likely to have 
had a proprietary network prior to 1987. For this reason, we would 
expect a negative coefficient. 
Descriptive statistics for variables used in the hazard model appear in 
Table 2. 
5. Results 
Results of the estimation of the model are presented in Table 3; 
standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficient, the t 
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statistics are in the second column, and the significance levels are in the 
third column. The log-likelihood ratio is -395.8, and the estimator converged 
relatively quickly. The variables are all of the expected sign, with the 
exception of the OWNBRANCH and POPCHANGE variables.. With the exception of the 
OCC-EX,P, OWHBRANCH, POPCKANGE, SAL-EMP, and LNDEP variables, the coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. 
The negative coefficient on the UGBASE variable suggests that, 
consistent with the low level of competition in shared necdorks in the region 
in 1987, and the success of Yankee in Connecticut, the sample population 
expected a high participation equilibrium to occur, and a strong bandwagon 
effect developed. This inference is supported by the negative coefficient on 
COMPETITION; the measured competition grew over the sample period. It is 
further highlighted by the coefficient on a, which reveals that, after taking 
account of the variables in the estimation, the hazard r'S;te"bas increasing. 
This is consistent with the assumption of an increase in the technology of 
ATMs and broadly consistent with the literature on the diffusion of 
technology. The strongly negative coefficient on LAGBASE, however, is more 
.- 
novel and is in accord with the network externality theory. 
6 
The insignificant coefficient on OWNBRANCH rejects the hypothesis that 
OWNBRANCH is both a good measure of a bank's proprietary network and that 
there were significant opportunity costs in joining a shared network. More 
important, though, the insignificant coefficient on OWNBRANCH suggests that 
the network effect in a shared network is not derived only at the level of a 
bank's own branch network, as was found to be true in Saloner and Shepard with 
regard to proprietary (nonshared) ATM networks in the 1970s. 
The positive coefficient on MKTBRANCH reflects the fact that banks in 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93-37 
markets that have more branch offices per capita tend to adopt membership 
sooner than banks in other markets. Combining the effects on the hazard 
function of MKTBRANCH in both the MKTBRANCH and POPBRANCH variables we can use 
the fact that the coefficient in a Weibull estimation is the derivative of the 
log of the hazard rate. Calculating, we have that (dln[hazard])/(dKKTBRANCH) 
- .012, with a standard error of .00423, and a t-statistic of 2.8. In other 
- 
words, adding 100 branches to a market, holding other things equal at the mean 
of the sample, would increase the hazard rate by 120 percent. We interpret 
this as confirming the expectations of a bank, that in a heavily-branched 
market its customers will have more Yankee-affiliated locations available th$n 
in a sparsely branched market, thus leading to quicker adoption in the 
heavily-branched market. It may also reflect demographic and geographic 
factors that create a demand for a larger number of service delivery locations 
b ...- than in other markets. This factor would also tend to make the network 
externality especially valuable for banks in such a market. We interpret the 
combination of the signs on OWNBRANCH and MKTBRANCH as strongly confirming the 
hypothesis of the model, which is that the network effects are external to the 
individual bank. 
The neiative coefficient on MKTPOP shows that, in the more populous 
markets banks had a tendency to adopt membership more slowly than in the less 
populated markets. The negative coefficient on POPCHANGE shows that in 
markets that had the strongest population growth in the 1980s, Yankee 
membership was adopted relatively slowly. This is a puzzling result, but may 
reflect that most of the growth in population in the 1980s in New England had 
taken place by 1987. If this were the case, then our measure of demand growth 
is not a good one. Alternatively, adoption of different shared networks may 
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allow banks to differentiate themselves from one another, an important 
marketing advantage in appealing to potential new customers (and there are 
more potential new customers in fast growing areas). If this were the case, 
we would expect to see slower Yankee adoption in fast growing areas, as some 
banks would adopt other networks to differentiate themselves from the Yankee 
banks. 
The positive coefficient on SAL-EMP shows that banks with high labor 
expenses tended to adopt Yankee membership early, which suggests that shared 
networks did tend to substitute for labor expenses. The positive but 
insignificant coefficient on OCC-EXP suggests that, to the extent that OCC- 
EXP measures capital expenses for a bank in 1987, Yankee membership does not 
substitute for existing capital. This leaves open the that Yankee 
membership might substitute for new branches. The positive coefficient on 
LNDEP suggests that larger banks tended to adopt sooner than smaller banks. 
Since LNDEP proxies for the number of customers a bank itself has, this 
finding tends to support the idea that banks expect to capture a share of the 
benefits their customers receive from a shared network. 
The negative and significant signs on the coefficients of PRICE and 
COMPETITION ire reassuring in that they suggest that the membership decision 
responded typically to the law of demand. The negative coefficient on the 
CONCENTRATION measure suggests that in more competitive markets adoption was 
quicker. However, this could be caused by collinearity COMPETITION and 
IAGBASE. Reestimating the model with LAGBASE measured as the installed 
proportional base of Yankee deposits at the state level (rather than at the 
market level), and with no other changes to the variables, results in no 
changes of signs or levels of significance of any of the variables, with the 
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exception of changing the coefficient on COMPETITION to being insignificant. 
The estimation with the state level measure of LAGBASE is important in 
its own right. If a significant percentage of a market's banks had already 
joined Yankee, then one might expect a negative coefficient on LAGBASE, not 
because of a network externality, but rather because of the combination of the 
arithmetic fact that there are fewer candidates for Yankee membership and a 
two-tailed distribution of benefits to Yankee membership. By testing the 
model using LAGBASE measured at the state level, we substantially eliminate 
the first element of the alternative explanation for a significantly negative 
coefficient on LAGBASE. 
The negative coefficient on BHCDUMMY does suggest, to the extent that 
larger banking organizations were more likely to have a proprietary network, 
that there is an opportunity cost in moving from a proprietary to a shared 
-.'..... 
network. 
Various sensitivity checks were made and suggest that the results of the 
model are robust. The model was run using the exponential distribution, with 
sign, size, and significance of all the coefficients virtually unchanged, with 
the exception that the hazard rate is assumed to be constant in the 
exponential model. In order to assess the degree of possible collinearity 
between MKTBRANCH and MKTPOP, and because MKTPOP is less theoretically based 
on the model, the estimation was done dropping KKTPOP. With the exception of 
LNDEP losing significance (but retaining its sign and size), no other variable 
changed sign, size, or level of significance. This suggests that collinearity 
is not an important problem in the estimation, A large bank, BayBanks, was 
dropped from the estimation because it had its own large proprietary shared 
network. Again none of the results was altered significantly. . 
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6. Conclusion 
The model of adoption of a shared network technology presented in this 
paper, relying on the work of Cabral, takes into account the difficulty of 
capturing the dynamics of the adoption process. The method chosen here 
focuses on measuring the relative benefits a bank is likely to enjoy from 
Yankee membership. In any equilibrium those banks with relatively high 
benefits will join, while those with benefits below some level will not join. 
By modeling the features of banks, and their markets, that enhance the 
value of network membership, we identified relationships between the 
probability of joining the network and observable proxies for variables 
implied by the model. In particular, we found that the installed base of 
network membership is negatively related to the hazard rate, revealing that 
there were strong bandwagon effects in network adoption. Furthermore, we 
--w .,.a- 
found that the number of bank branches in a market is positively related to 
adoption of Yankee membership, while the number of a bank's own branches is 
not related to early adoption. These findings are novel for several reasons. 
As noted above, Saloner and Shepard ( 1 9 9 2 )  find that a bank's own branches are 
.- 
positive and significant in explaining the likelihood of adopting ATMs early, 
for the decade of the 1970s, prior to the advent of shared networks. Our 
results complement theirs. The absence of a relationship between adoption and 
number of own branches suggests that in a shared network benefits are 
conferred by other members and the locations they provide to one's own 
customers, rather than arising only in a bank's own branch network. 
It is notable that the number of branches in the market in 1987 is not 
directly related to the number of Yankee nodes, so MXTBRANCH is at best a 
rough measure and probably understates the network externality i~volved. 
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However, the number of branches in a market may act as a device to help 
potential members to coordinate their adoption decisions. It may also be the 
case that while more branches in the market may ultimately be related to the 
number of Yankee locations available (our first explanation), it may also be 
true that the number of branches in a market reveal geographic, demographic, 
and migratory facts about the market that make many service locations 
especially valuable. For example, there may be a high number of branches 
because ~ e o p l e  work and live in different locations in the market and need 
service in both places. In this case, a high number of branches in a market 
may be related to those institutions that especially value more service 
locations; again this would confer a high value to the network externality 
provided by Yankee membership. Finally, the finding lends support to the 
proposition that in a shared ATM network, although network effects no longer 
are generated in one's own branch network, the externalities under shar%g+- 
still retain a strong geographic component. The local (marketwide) 
externality is strong enough to generate the results. 
The relationship between branching and adoption of network membership, 
and between ATM deployment and network membership are topics for further 
research. 
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution of Banks by State 
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